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SUDDEN DEATH: LEAGUE LABOR
DISPUTES, SPORTS LICENSING AND
FORCE MAJEURE NEGLECT
GARY D. WAY*
I. INTRODUCrION
In most fights agreements entered into with a major professional
sports league, team or player association, force majeure' protection is
badly neglected-to the extent it is addressed at all. Until relatively re-
cently, where such protection existed, frequently the provision had been
"thrown-in" at the 12th-hour request of the licensee or sponsor ("licen-
see") with minimal care given to the exact formulation of the clause.
Often, the resulting language was simply recycled force majeure "boiler-
plate" long ago borrowed from some other party's agreement. The rela-
tive importance of such provisions within an agreement is perhaps best
signaled by their typical insertion at the end of the contract, just before
the provision that states that "paragraph captions are for convenience
only." However, the unprecedented extent of labor strife in Major
League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Hockey League (the "NHL")
and the National Basketball Association (the "NBA") experienced dur-
ing the 1994-95 and 1995-96 playing seasons2 sent many licensees and
t Copyright 1997 by Gary D. Way. All rights reserved.
* The author, a former league marketing attorney, is a member of the Legal Department
at NIKE, Inc., functioning primarily in the area of athlete and league affairs. The views ex-
pressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of NIKE,
Inc. The author gratefully acknowledges Charles Chasin, Esq. and Paul J. Kelly, Jr., Esq. for
their thoughtful review of, and comments on, earlier drafts of this article. In addition, the
author wishes to express a special thanks to his wife, Jill, whose repeated encouragement to
"stick with it" provided the much-needed motivation to see this writing project through to
completion when there seemed no end in sight to the baseball labor dispute - a denouement
necessary to conclude this article.
1. "Force Majeure," a French term, literally meaning "superior force." An unforeseeable
natural or human event beyond the control of the parties to a contract, rendering performance
of a contract impossible. RANDOM HousE LEGAL DicrIoNARY 101 (1st ed. 1996).
2. A 232-day MLB player strike that forced the cancellation of the final third of the 1994
season, all post-season play, and a 3-week postponement of the 1995 "Opening Day;" an NHL
lock-out that delayed the start of their 1994 season from October 1st to January 20, 1995,
reducing the season to a 48-game schedule, and resulting in the cancellation of the 1995 All-
Star Game; and the 11 week NBA lock-out of its players during the summer of 1995, followed
by a 9 week lock-out of its referees. While the major sports leagues are finally enjoying a
period of relative labor peace, war drums can be heard in the distance. The National Football
League (the "NFL") has recently expressed its dissatisfaction with their current labor contract
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licensors alike flipping furiously to the last pages of their agreements to
determine what contractual protection was afforded them in the event of
a League work stoppage. Too often, the answer was none, or the answer
was unclear. Prior to the opening of MLB's spring training in 1995, that
precise state of uncertainty metastasized into a suit being filed against
the New York Yankees by their radio broadcast partner over the
Yankees' use of replacement players- a suit that could have been eas-
ily avoided with the mere addition of a single sentence to their
agreement.
While the average contract lawyer is undoubtedly familiar with force
majeure provisions, and views the drafting or negotiation of such provi-
sions as a routine matter, relatively few have much experience with them
in a sports licensing context. Unfortunately, this inexperience was often
painfully brought to light amid the multi-sport labor discord that reached
its zenith in Autumn 1994.4 In the wake of the then-current MLB player
strike, and threatened disruptions of the upcoming NHL and NBA sea-
sons, force majeure provisions contained in pre-existing agreements
came under close scrutiny. Moreover, such provisions came to be
viewed as essential components of every contemplated pro sports rights
agreement and were often elevated to "deal breaker" points in many
negotiations.
This article is intended to help the attorney casually involved with
sports licensing to negotiate these critical provisions, as well as provide
some useful suggestions for the well-versed. Part I of this article pro-
vides a comparative view of the negotiating posture of parties towards
force majeure. Part II catalogs the force majuere provisions currently in
use in professional sports licensing. Part III subsequently analyzes the
protection afforded by these provisions under various labor dispute sce-
narios. Part IV then examines and explains the serious defects com-
with Commissioner Paul Tagliabue publicly stating that "[a] number of clubs are really strug-
gling with this agreement" and indicating that the league may seek an early out. Don Cronin,
Sportline, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 1997, at 1C. Just a few weeks earlier, Major League Soccer
("MLS"), in only its second season of existence, was sued by its players association alleging,
among other anti-competitive practices, that the league illegally secured from its players group
licensing rights for merchandising. Paul Gardner, Players Association Sues MLS, SoccER
AMERICA, Mar. 3, 1997, at 12. For purposes of this article, MLB, MLS, the NBA, the NFL and
the NHL are collectively referred to as the "Leagues."
3. WABC-AM Radio, Inc. v. New York Yankees Partnership, No. 95-106671 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. filed March 17, 1995). See infra part I11(c).
4. October 1994 saw the cancellation of the World Series for the first time in 90 years and
the indefinite postponement of the start of the 1994 NHL Season. In addition, only a 12th
hour "no strike, no lock-out" agreement reached between the NBA and its players averted a
MLB-NHL-NBA work stoppage trifecta.
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monly found in such provisions and, lastly, Part V provides practical
drafting advice coupled with recommended approaches to various force
majeure issues.
II. THE FACE-OFF
Providing licensees with force majeure protection is outside the li-
censing modality of the Leagues. The agreements generated by Major
League Baseball Properties ("MLBP"), NBA Properties ("NBAP"),
National Football League Properties ("NFLP") and NHL Enterprises
("NHLE")-the licensing arms of the respective Leagues (collectively,
"Properties")-do not, as a matter of routine, include force majeure
provisions.' A survey of the form merchandise licenses issued by the
various Properties (the most numerous forms of agreement in effect6),
and the three professional player associations ("PAs") engaged in licens-
ing,7 will reveal that force majeure is not included as a standard term or
condition. An understanding of the rationale behind this conspicuous ab-
sence is critical to developing intelligent and coherent strategies for ne-
gotiating these sensitive provisions.
Underlying all licensor aversion to force majeure relief is a single uni-
versal imperative-the desperate need to meet its earning goals. Over
the past decade, licensing has evolved from essentially a public relations
function, and negligible source of income, to a major profit center. Fu-
eled by a long string of successive team merchandise sales records, team
owners (the exclusive shareholders in each League's Properties) have
come to expect ever-increasing royalty and rights fee payments. For
each season, benchmarks are established based upon licensing payments
made by Properties to their owners the preceding season and revenue
projections made based upon guaranteed royalties and scheduled rights
5. However, force majeure provisions are not uncommon in broadcast agreements, and in
sponsorship agreements to a lesser extent, for many of the reasons discussed at note 16 infra.
6. While each league (and member team) typically has fewer than 20-30 sponsors, and
perhaps 2 or 3 broadcast partners, each league has 150 or more licensees (not including local
licensees and premium item manufacturers) and both MLB and the NFL have in excess of
300. Because merchandise licenses are by far the most widely circulated forms of agreements,
they are, accordingly, the primary focus of this article.
7. The Major League Baseball Players Association ("Baseball PA"), National Football
Players Association ("Football PA") and NHL Players Association ("Hockey PA") maintain
and administer a so-called "Group" licensing program on behalf of their players (i.e., licensing
covering the collective use of a designated minimum number of players). The National Bas-
ketball Players Association has by license agreement granted to NBAP the exclusive right to
license to third parties the use of current NBA players on a Group basis. MLS, through its
form of uniform player contract, has secured such rights directly through their individual play-
ers. See generally Gardner, supra note 2, at 13.
1997]
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fee payments. The high owner expectations created by the extraordinary
marketing success of the past ten years, coupled with soaring team oper-
ation costs, places enormous pressure on each League's Properties (or
team marketing department in the case of direct licensing arrangements
such as local market sponsorships, as opposed to league-wide, sponsor-
ship arrangements) to exceed the past year's performance and to meet
their forecasted revenue level.
That pressure has, in recent years, been greatly exacerbated by the
new economics wrought by collective bargaining among the Leagues and
their respective PAs. Two of the last four collective bargaining agree-
ments ("CBA") negotiated-the NFL and NBA CBAs-provide for
profit sharing that guarantees their players near-equal (and even major-
ity) share of broadly defined League revenues,8 while the recently rati-
fied MLB labor agreement provides for "an unprecedented level of
revenue sharing between rich and poor clubs." 9 Furthermore, the NFL/
NBA kinds of CBAs provide players with participation in league reve-
nue streams that historically have not been shared with players, such as
luxury suite revenues and international television rights fees.10 As a con-
sequence of the new advent of owner sharing of previously sheltered
revenue, leagues and teams are extremely reluctant to assume any finan-
cial risk in the licensing area-unlike in their core business (i.e., compet-
itive team sports) where risk is commonplace (e.g., long-term guaranteed
player contracts, or the private financing of stadium/arena construction).
Hand-in-hand with the organization imperative is a deeply held fun-
damental belief about the nature of the merchandise licensing business.
Licensors view licensed product agreements as unique investment vehi-
cles. A League license provides a manufacturer entree into the $11.5
8. The NFL CBA currently guarantees the players 63% of "Designated Gross Revenues"
(i.e., ticket and broadcast revenues). See Larry Weisman, Judge Tells NFL to Raise Salary Cap
$2 Million, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 1996, at 1C. At the same time, the NBA CBA guarantees its
players up to 50.8% of "Basketball Related Revenues" (i.e., broadcast and licensing revenues,
and miscellaneous arena-generated revenues). Clifton Brown, Labor Agreement Ratiied by
N.B.A. Players, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 14, 1995, at B17, B22.
9. Murray Chass, Reluctantly, Baseball Owners Approve a Pact With Players, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 1996, at Al.
10. For purposes of the NFL CBA, "Designated Gross Revenues" includes ticket reve-
nue, "luxury boxes" revenue, and all broadcast revenues "without limitation." NFL COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 1993-2000, Art. XXIV, §l(a)(i). The NBA's Basketball
Related Revenues definition, for the first time, includes revenue from luxury suites, parking,
concessions sales, international television and arena signage. NBA NEWs, vol. 50, Sept. 25,
1995, at 3.
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billion sports licensing market (pre-baseball strike)"1-a market that has
enjoyed sustained, often double-digit, growth for over a decade. In light
of that, licensors feel justified in insisting upon a guaranteed fee in re-
turn for providing a licensee with such an extraordinary investment op-
portunity. Moreover, a valid argument can be made that every team
sport and/or event property carries with it certain inherent risks that are
properly borne by the licensee. Team popularity, measured by either
merchandise sales or television ratings, has always been a function of on-
field success which, by its very nature, is speculative. Event-based licens-
ing is similarly speculative. Typically, licensees are often required to
commit to large royalty guarantees well in advance of the event and are,
thus, forced to "roll the dice." No protection against under performance
is given to them. For example, as a condition to participation in the 1994
World Cup soccer licensing program, manufacturers were required to
make significant royalty guarantees without any assurance as to how the
event would be received in the United States-a first-time host country.
In view of the inherent speculative nature of sports merchandise licens-
ing, licensors of a proven property such as the Leagues do not believe
that they should have to share with the manufacturer the risk that their
property may be temporarily rendered unpopular, such as by a labor
dispute-particularly when diminished popularity has always been a li-
censee risk. Moreover, licensors are particularly unsympathetic to shar-
ing business loss consequent of a work stoppage in view of the fact that
the licensor's loss of revenue and damage to its business will invariably
far exceed that of any particular licensee.
There are also technical reasons for the absence of force majeure pro-
visions in most sports licenses. The purposes of a force majeure provision
are "to limit damages in a case where the reasonable expectations of the
parties and the performance of the contract have been frustrated by cir-
cumstances beyond the control of the parties."12 The essence of a trade-
mark license (or agreement granting rights of publicity) is the
conveyance of intellectual property rights. Because of the nature of such
rights, the occurrence of a force majeure provision arguably should
neither impair the ability of the licensor to convey its property rights nor
arguably the licensee's ability to exercise them. Accordingly, since a
11. McGee, Sport-Anon: A 12-Step Program Developed to Get the Sporting Goods Busi-
ness Back On Its Feet, SPOR-STYLE, July 1995, at 23.
12. United Equities Co. v. First Nat. City Bank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1st Dept. 1976), affd
mem, 41 N.Y.2d 1032, 363 N.E.2d 1385 (1977); see generally 407 East 61st Garage v. Savoy
Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 275, 282, 244 N.E.2d 37, 42 (1968).
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force majeure provision should not frustrate a party's performance, pro-
tection against such occurrences is not required.
From the licensor's perspective, there are also two significant practi-
cal reasons for its distaste for force majeure provisions. First, it is simply
sound business and legal practice for a licensor to not gratuitously in-
clude any provision that primarily, if not exclusively, operates to the
benefit of the licensee. This is particularly true in merchandise licensing.
Under a merchandise license, the grantor has few affirmative obliga-
tions: to convey incontestable rights; to provide guidance on proper us-
age of the licensed properties; to exercise reasonable quality control, and
to maintain and enforce its rights in and to the licensed properties. All
of these obligations can be performed notwithstanding any manner of
force majeure. On the other hand, a merchandise license imposes nu-
merous non-waivable requirements upon the licensee such as: meeting a
product launch date; the manufacture of specific numbers of product
lines or styles; the maintenance of prescribed inventory levels; merchan-
dise support obligations; the active advertisement and promotion of the
licensed products; and minimum royalty payments to name a few. These
types of obligations may be difficult, if not impossible, to meet in the
face of the more "common" force majeure conditions such as fire, natu-
ral disasters and other "acts of God." Until the acute labor strife of the
past three years, it was usually with these more common events in
mind-occurrences affecting product manufacture or distribution-that
licensees were motivated to request force majeure protection.' 3
The second, and in some circumstances the most compelling, reason
for licensor resistance to labor-based force majeure is that in the event of
a work stoppage, royalties and rights fee payments may be the licensor's
principal or only source of revenue. This is particularly true of player
associations. For PAs, licensing revenues are even more critical than
they are for Leagues or teams; they constitute their single-largest source
of income and fund such union work stoppage related activities as litiga-
13. In many of the most profitable licensing categories for the Leagues, the outerwear,
headwear and technology categories (e.g., video games, CD-ROM products, etc.), the licen-
sees typically subcontract the manufacture of all or part of their products to third-party opera-
tions located in countries in the Asian Pacific and Latin America. Because of the long lead
times required for the manufacture of these products, the frequency of natural disasters (mon-
soons, floods, etc.) in many of these areas, the political and/or economic instability that exist in
many countries within these regions, coupled with the vagaries of ocean transit, much is be-
yond the reasonable control of the licensee. Consequently, this "key" group of licensees has
powerful incentives to insulate themselves from the types of risks characterized above as
"common" force majeures.
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tion and hardship benefits for players. 4 As Donald Fehr, Executive Di-
rector of the Baseball PA, has stated with respect to licensing revenues,
"[t]he ability to generate income on behalf of the players provides [the
Players Association] with resources that otherwise would be difficult to
secure".
15
It is against the above backdrop that a licensee must negotiate for
relief against League labor disputes. 6 While licensors are reluctant to
grant such concessions, chiefly because of their risk aversion, relief is
often available to a licensee making a substantial financial commitment
to the League and willing to support a League's brand building activities
through significant electronic media and event sponsorship support.
14. Mike Freeman, Sports Unions Flex Muscles With Financial Clout, N.Y. TiMES, Mar.
21, 1995, at Bl1, B15.
15. Id. In addition to the foregoing practical reasons, in some cases, force majeure protec-
tion is simply superfluous. If a League has a signed CBA that extends through the term of a
license agreement to be entered into, the licensor will not be vulnerable to the one type of
force majeure occurrence that can arguably disable it, namely a work stoppage. Under such
circumstances, sometimes a licensor will unwisely include work stoppage protection at the
behest of a licensee. lypically, this concession is made as a display of a licensor's flexibility
and justified as a "no-harm, no-foul" accommodation. This cavalier approach can seriously
undermine a licensor's position on the issue in a subsequent negotiation. If a licensor is going
to "throw-in" a force majeure provision, it should only do so mindful of the reality that non-
standard terms generally have a life-span that is coterminous with the length of the particular
licensing relationship. Invariably, the point of departure in any contract renewal discussions
are the terms of the current agreement. Given that, and the fact that there is frequently a
different League lawyer involved in each successive contract negotiation, it is likely that any
specifically requested provision will be grandfathered into successor agreements without any
further discussion or renewed deliberation, and even though there has been a "sea change" in
circumstances. Put simply, having once agreed to a provision, it may be impossible to object
to its inclusion in subsequent agreements with the same party. This is particularly true in the
case of work stoppage protection. If such a provision is included under circumstances where
the risk is remote (i.e., where a CBA is in place), there cannot be any principled justification
for not including such protection where the risk is significant.
16. While the reasons discussed above in this section with respect to merchandise licens-
ing are equally applicable within the sponsorship context, force majeure provisions are not
uncommon in broadcast and sponsorship agreements. Unlike in the merchandise licensing
setting, under a broadcast or sponsor agreement, the League or team frequently has numerous
affirmative performance obligations that it may not be able meet in the event of a work stop-
page. The most obvious example is in the case of broadcast agreements where the licensor is
responsible for the delivery of the product to the broadcaster. Less apparent examples in-
clude TV ratings and audience delivery guarantees promised to advertisers, media placement
obligations and League commitment to execute specific promotional programs (e.g., All-Star
balloting) or stage specific events (e.g., League championships or All-Star Game).
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III. READING THE COVERAGE
A. Checking The Formation
To the extent force majeure protection can be found in sports market-
ing agreements, three types are the most common: (i) the generic force
majeure provision ("Generic Provision"); (ii) the so-called "Strike
Clause;" and (iii) the sports-specific force majeure provision ("Sports
FM").
Generic Provisions tend to be formulated in one of two ways. One is
the truly generic form. This form simply provides that relief is available
"[i]f either party hereto shall have been prevented, in whole or in part,
from performing its obligations hereunder by virtue of any cause beyond
such party's control.. ." The other common form of Generic Provision
contains an enumeration of specific force majeure conditions limited to
casualties, "acts of God" and governmental prohibitions. Typical of this
latter form is the following clause which relieves performance in the
event of "fire, flood, war, governmental law or restrictions, natural disas-
ter, Acts of God, or other similar causes beyond the reasonable control
of such party."
A Strike Clause is essentially a generic provision containing a refer-
ence to labor disputes in the form of a strike. Force majeure provisions
containing strike language generally follow the same construction as the
Generic Provision but include a non-specific reference to strike. The fol-
lowing enumeration is typical: "fire, flood, war, riot, strike, natural dis-
aster, compliance with law or governmental regulation, or any other
event beyond the control of the party."
The third variation, the Sports FM, is tailored to relationships involv-
ing sports property licensors and specifically contemplates League labor
disputes. The following examples are common forms of this type of
provision:
Neither party shall hold the other responsible for any delay or
failure of performance occasioned or caused by acts beyond the
reasonable control of the party including, but not limited to, acts
of war, fire, natural disaster or other acts of God, interruption of
the... Season... (emphasis added)
or
Neither party shall hold the other responsible for any delay or
failure of performance occasioned or caused by acts beyond the
reasonable control of the party including, but not limited to, labor
disputes [between the League and its players], acts of war, fire,
natural disaster... (emphasis added)
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B. Zone Coverage
As the Generic Provision illustrates, it is not uncommon to find a
force majeure provision that does not list labor disputes in its enumera-
tion. To a party seeking to take advantage of such a provision in the
event of a League labor dispute, the availability of relief will depend on
the form of the particular provision. If the provision does not contain an
enumeration, then a labor dispute is likely to be deemed covered consis-
tent with the principle of contra proferentem which provides that an am-
biguous provision is construed against the party that selected the
language17-which in most cases, will have been the licensor/drafter.
Conversely, if the provision contains an enumeration, the omitted refer-
ence to strike will be fatal to the charging party. With respect to enumer-
ations, it is a well-settled principle of contract interpretation that "only if
the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually pre-
vents a party's performance will that party be excused."'
In the absence of specific reference to labor events, a party could
nonetheless assert that a League work stoppage is covered under the
commonly included catch-all clause "and other acts beyond the control
of a party." However, a party is unlikely to prevail on this theory either.
Applying the principle of ejusdem generis that governs the interpretation
of such clauses, general words following a detailed enumeration are not
to be given expansive meaning; they are confined to things of the same
nature as the particular matter aforementioned. 9 Since the recited con-
ditions all pertain to occurrences affecting the ability to manufacture or
distribute merchandise, a League work stoppage is different in kind and
nature from the enumerated force majeure events and, therefore, falls
outside the events contemplated by the provision.
17. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203,216,25 L.Ed.2d 224,235 (1970), reh'g denied,
397 U.S. 1031 (1970).
18. Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900, 902-03, 519 N.E.2d 295, 296
(1987). This article assumes the application of New York substantive law pursuant to either
the choice of law designation contained in MLBP, NBAP, NFLP, NHLE and Baseball PA
agreements (each of these licensors, as well as the recently relocated offices of MLS, are head-
quartered in New York City; the Football PA is headquartered in Washington D.C. and the
Hockey PA in Toronto), or conflicts principles. See generally Gould Entertainment Corpora-
tion v. Bodo, 107 F.R.D. 308, 312, n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Finding New York law applicable in
an action for a breach of a licensing agreement, brought by a New York corporation, even
though defendants were Italian residents and the territory for the license was Italy. In reach-
ing this conclusion, the Court placed great weight upon, among other considerations, the fact
that the license was negotiated in New York, the contract was signed in New York, and the
payments under the license were made to plaintiff in New York.).
19. Kel Kim, 70 N.Y.2d at 903,519 N.E.2d at 297; WILLISTON, CorNrn~crs §1968 209 (3d.
ed. 1979).
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A licensee fortunate enough to have a Strike Clause in its agreement
may well consider itself protected in the event of a League labor dispute.
However, even when strike is included in the force majeure enumeration,
whether such language will provide the licensee with protection in the
event of various forms of labor dispute is far from clear.
If the reference to strike is non-specific, and therefore may refer to
those of a manufacturer's workers, material supplier, shippers, et cetera,
and a licensee seeks to take advantage of a Strike Clause in the event of
a player strike, a licensor may be able to successfully rebut the presump-
tion that a Strike Clause contemplates player strikes. The mere refer-
ence to strike in this kind of generic force majeure provision is not so
free from ambiguity as to preclude extrinsic evidence. The proper inter-
pretation of words in an agreement frequently depends on the circum-
stances that existed when the contract was concluded and then within
the contemplation of the parties.2" As discussed above, it has usually
been with production or distribution thwarting events in mind that man-
ufacturers have sought force majeure protection. Upon a trial or in arbi-
tration, a licensor may be able to show that such occurrences were the
expressed and exclusive concern of the licensee and, thus, establish the
understanding of the parties as of the inception of the agreement. 21 As
any such case will necessarily turn on its particular facts, it is impossible
to predict the likelihood of a licensor's success under such a scenario.
The likely result is much clearer in a case where a licensee seeks to
invoke a Strike Clause in response to an owner lock-out; the licensee is
unlikely to prevail. Many Strike Clauses are silent on the effect of a
lock-out. Typically, licensees are narrow in their request for force
majeure protection. In negotiating such a provision, licensees regularly
make a specific request for the inclusion of the word "strike." The ex-
perienced drafter, in keeping with the time-honored principle of provid-
ing for only as much as was expressly requested and agreed upon, will
only provide for strikes. Unfortunately, such an oversight on the part of
the licensee can have devastating consequences.
While it is not uncommon for lay people and licensing lawyers unfa-
miliar with labor law-as is sometimes the case with those responsible
for negotiating licensing agreements-to think of strike and lock-out as
20. Osborn v. Wilson & Co., 193 N.Y.S. 241 (1922), affd, 206 A.D. 787, 200 N.Y.S. 938
(1923); WILLISTON, supra note 19, at 209.
21. There is another inchoate issue raised by the ambiguity in the use of the term strike.
Under the principle of contra proferentem, ambiguous contract language is resolved against
the drafter. WILLISTON, supra note 19, §621, at 760-62. However, such language could be just
as easily construed against the licensee, the party that frequently provides the exact language.
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being interchangeable, the two terms clearly are not. The term strike is
statutorily defined 2 and distinguished from lock-out throughout the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").3 Consequently, the term strike
is unlikely to be interpreted by any court as being inclusive of lock-out.
Accordingly, absent specific reference to lock-out, the doctrine that only
the occurrence of a specifically enumerated event will excuse a party's
non-performance should obtain to bar reliance upon a Strike Clause in
the event of a lock-out.2 4 While a licensee can argue that a lock-out is an
event of the same kind and nature as a strike and, therefore, should be
covered under the principle of ejusdem generis, such argument should be
unpersuasive since a lock-out is a clearly foreseeable event that could
have been easily guarded against in the agreement.2' Indeed, in view of
an express reference to strike in an enumeration, a court should con-
clude that the omission of lock-out from such a provision was
intentional.
C. The Curve Ball: Use of Replacements
Assuming the existence of a force majeure provision that covers a
"work stoppage" or "interruption of the season," what is the effect of
conducting games using replacement players? For instance, the NFL
played three regular season games using replacement players during the
261987 strike-shortened season. 6 More recently, MLB opened Spring
Training and the 1995 exhibition season with replacement players. The
use of replacement players raises a unique paradox-the existence of a
covered force majuere occurrence (i.e., a strike or lock-out), but a con-
tinuation of play. If this contingency is not specifically addressed in an
agreement, it may be left to the courts to determine the obligations of
the parties. Such was the case in WABC-AM Radio v. New York
Yankees.
22. 29 U.S.C. §142(2) (1988).
23. 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq., passim. While the NLRA contains no specific definition of
"lock-out," the term is given statutory recognition in four separate sections: §8(d)(4) prohibits
lock-outs (and strikes) for the purposes of terminating or modifying a collective bargaining
contract until the 60-day notice period has run, 29 U.S.C. §158(d)(4); §203(c) requires the
Director of Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to seek settlements of disputes "with-
out resort to strike, lock-out, or other coercion" by the parties, 29 U.S.C. §173(c); and §206
and §208(a) both grant powers to the President to deal with "threatened or actual strike or
lock-out" which constitute national emergencies, 29 U.S.C. §176; §178(a).
24. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
25. See Kel Kim, 70 N.Y.2d at 902, 519 N.E.2d at 296.
26. THE OF~IciAL NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 1996 RECORD & FACr BOOK 274, col. 2
(1996).
1997]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
WABC-AM Radio holds the radio broadcast rights to New York Yan-
kee games and earns revenues in connection therewith through its sale
of advertising time in these broadcasts2 7 In its complaint, WABC as-
serted that it "would not have agreed to pay millions of dollars to [the
Yankees] for such rights unless it was understood that professional Ma-
jor League baseball games by the real Yankees would be scheduled and
made available for broadcast." 2 Following the Yankees' announced
plan to provide for broadcast games to be played by replacement play-
ers, and WABC's determination that such games were "valueless" to
[the station] because virtually no advertiser will pay to advertise on
broadcasts of such games" and that the provision of such games was "a
breach by [the Yankees] of its contractual obligations," 29 WABC filed an
action seeking a court declaration of each party's contractual obligations
and seeking $10 million in damages-a suit necessitated only because of
the failure of the parties to address this foreseeable occurrence in their
contract.30
Presumably, it is only because the agreement between the parties
does not contain a force majeure provision dealing with labor disputes
that the station was compelled to resort to litigation for a determination
of its rights.31 As a result of this same omission, Plaintiff's claim was
fashioned to rely upon classic principles of contract law. The gravamen
of WABC's claim was that the Yankees' decision to provide the station
with "replacement games" to broadcast because of the player strike
"deprive[d] WABC of its reasonably expected benefits under the Agree-
ment"32 and "breach[ed] the implied covenant of good faith and fair
27. The Complaint at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. While the parties entered into the subject agreement as of September 24,1986, it must
be noted that WABC had been the Yankees' radio station through two previous League work
stoppages: the 50-day player strike during the 1981 Season and the 2-day strike during the
1985 Season. In view of these experiences, WABC should have, at the very least, foreseen the
possibility of a strike or lock-out (and, arguably, even the potential use of replacement play-
ers given the NFL's conduct of replacement games in 1987) and explicitly addressed such an
occurrence. The Complaint at 94.
31. As plaintiff states: "WABC faces the prospect of having to perform its obligations
under the Agreement, including payment of substantial sums of money and broadcast of Re-
placement Baseball games, to its considerable loss and damage, for an indefinite period of
time. [The New York Yankees] den[y] that its scheduling and making available of Replace-
ment Baseball games is in breach of its obligations pursuant to the Agreement. A real and
live legal controversy between the parties therefore exists as to their respective obligations
under the Agreement." The Complaint at 9124-26.
32. Id. at %16.
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dealing in the Agreement. '3 3  While the players' return to work effec-
tively mooted this action and resulted in the suit being dropped,' the
fact remains that without a force majeure frame of reference in which to
interpret the rights of the parties, it would have been difficult to predict
the outcome of this suit. However, it is clear that with the inclusion of a
Sports FM, the Court's decision would have at least been based on an
interpretation of specific agreement terms rather than basic contract
principles.
IV. TECHNICAL FOULS
As a result of the cursory consideration often involved in last-minute
agreement to include a force majeure provision in a particular license, it
is not surprising that a close reading of such provisions often reveals a
variety of drafting flaws. The most serious of these flaws are found in
their scope of coverage, the triggering language used, tolling clauses and
in the lack of a damage requirement.
A. Scope of Coverage
For the reasons discussed in Section III above, the failure to fully
address the scope of coverage can have disastrous consequences. Often,
in order to ensure the fullest extent of coverage, parties will use terms
such as "labor dispute," "work stoppage" or "season interruption,"
rather than specific reference to strike and lock-out. While the use of
such terms will avoid the interpretation problems discussed above, none-
theless, underlying each of these word choices is a potential dispute.
Typical of the above-described provisions is the following:
Neither party shall hold the other responsible for any delay or
failure of performance occasioned or caused by acts beyond the
33. Id. at 20.
34. Airwaves, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 7, 1995, at B10. The players' return likely averted a spate
of similar litigation. Less than two weeks earlier, an industry survey cited television outlets of
12 MLB teams as having decided, or considering, dramatically changing their broadcast plans
because of the use of replacement players. The extent of their stated contractual rights to do
so wa unclear from the survey, however, based upon individual team responses, few parties
appeared to have provisions in their contracts covering labor-related issues. Baseball On TV:
Who Will Carry Replacement Games?, Thu SPORTS Bus. DAILY, Mar. 23, 1995, at 6.
35. In the absence of a force majeure provision, under the alleged facts it appears that
Plaintiff may have had a meritorious defense to nonperformance based upon the principle of
commercial frustration, a defense that may be similarly viable under certain types of merchan-
dise and sponsor agreements. However, an examination of this defense is beyond the scope of
this article.
1997]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
reasonable control of the party including, but not limited to, labor
disputes, acts of war, fire, natural disaster ... (emphasis added).
While the term "labor disputes" provides maximum breadth of cov-
erage, its use can lead to issues as to what kind of occurrence can. trigger
the operation of the provision. 6 The cited language begs the question of
what constitutes a "dispute." Does the expiration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement without reaching a new accord qualify?37 What about
the initiation of antitrust litigation? The pronouncement by a principal
that the parties are "far apart," or declaration of an impasse? These are
all fairly typical occurrences during a labor negotiation and invariably
precede a strike or a lock-out. These types of occurrences create an at-
mosphere of uncertainty in the marketplace and, more often, it is this
uncertainty that is the proximate cause of the injury to a licensee's busi-
ness. Typically, it is the fear of a work stoppage that prompts retailers to
curtail their up-front commitment for merchandise or to adopt a "wait
and see" approach to ordering.3" Given certain kinds of saber rattling,
orders for merchandise for the particular sport often decline substan-
tially long before a work stoppage materializes.39 Consequently, if the
reason for inclusion of the provision is to protect a licensee against the
adverse affect of a labor dispute, then logically the affected party should
be entitled to avail itself of such protection at the earliest point at which
its business is demonstrably injured.
Other terms popular with many drafters are the phrases "work stop-
page," "interruption of season," or similar language. As with the use of
labor dispute, utilizing work stoppage language is an effective means of
"covering the bases." While there can be no serious debate that such
language encompasses both strike and lock-out scenarios, this language
can give rise to issues of coverage as well. Specifically, it is possible for
there to be a strike or lock-out, yet for an affected party to not be able to
avail itself of protection afforded by these types of provisions precisely
because of that language choice. Since these types of provisions are trig-
gered by a halt in play, absent a specific contract carve-out, the use of
replacement players would deprive a licensee of a force majeure claim
36. The NLRA provides that "[t]he term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy con-
cerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment. . ." 29 U.S.C. §152(9) (1988).
37. If that is the case, then virtually every negotiation will trigger such a provision. In the
past 15 years, only once have Leagues and PAs renewed a collective bargaining agreement
without any lapse.
38. Jeff Jensen, NBA Lockout Slows Licensing Juggernaut, ADVERTISING AGE, July 17,
1995, at 6.
39. Id. See generally Topps Co., Tim WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1995, at A2; Bruce Horovitz,
Opening Day, and Nothing to Pitch, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1995, at 1B, 2B.
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based on work stoppage/interruption for any period of play using
replacements. Moreover, should an agreement be entered into during a
League's off-season, if a League engages replacement players and opens
its season as scheduled (pre-season or regular) using replacements then
there will have been no "work stoppage" or "interruption" at all. Fi-
na-ly, if the work action commences during the off-season, such as the
NBA's 1995 summer long lock-out, an injured licensee will not be able to
seek relief if its entitlement is based on season pre-emption or lost games
language.4 °
One of the most common drafting mistakes in the area of coverage is
to over describe the labor event. In an effort to be precise, some drafters
will gratuitously include modifiers, the unintended effect of which is to
convert language that is inclusive into language of exclusion. For exam-
ple, consider the above-quoted provision but modified as follows:
Neither party shall hold the other responsible for any delay or
failure of performance occasioned or caused by acts beyond the
reasonable control of the party including, but not limited to, labor
disputes [between the League and its players], acts of war, fire,
natural disaster ... (emphasis added).
By the addition of the emphasized language, the extent of coverage is
actually lessened. Whereas the clause without the qualifying language
was not limited simply to those involving players, with the addition of
the adverbial phrase, the type of disputes now covered is specifically lim-
ited to those between the League and its players. Nevertheless, given
that player-owner labor disputes have been of late the paramount force
majeure concern of a licensee, and that the addition of qualifying lan-
guage makes the coverage of any such disputes unequivocal, it may ap-
pear that whatever other coverage that is lost by this additional language
is of little consequence. However, when one views the other labor dis-
pute potentialities, it is obvious that the risks that have been assumed by
virtue of over specification can have equally devastating consequences.
For instance, by solely specifying labor disputes involving players, in the
event of a strike by game officials (e.g., referees, umpires, etc.) that
forces the cancellation or relocation of games a licensee would not be
entitled to any relief. Such an occurrence is no phantom risk. Prior to
the start of the 1995 MLB Season, league umpires-who had been
locked out since the first of that year-successfully petitioned the Onta-
40. The corollary to this loophole is whether a licensee is entitled to relief during the off-
season period in a situation where a work stoppage results in the loss of games, and then
carries into the off-season-a period when there is no loss of games. Does this occurrence
suspend relief?
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rio Labour Relations Board to bar MLB's use of replacement umpires in
the province.41 Obviously, in the face of that decision, had the parties
not reached a settlement, the removal of Blue Jay games out of the prov-
ince would have had a significant adverse economic impact upon the
team's broadcast partners,42 sponsors and Canadian licensees. More re-
cently, the NBA played its entire exhibition season schedule, and the
first month of the 1995-96 regular season, using replacement officials.
Another common pitfall, and similar to the above, resulting from the
ill-considered use of modifiers can be found in clauses that are based
upon the interruption of a "Season." As with the over-specification of
labor disputes, the addition of qualifying language to the term "Season"
can create more problems than it solves. Consider the following clause:
Neither party shall hold the other responsible for any delay or
failure of performance occasioned or caused by acts beyond the
reasonable control of the party including, but not limited to, acts
of war, fire, natural disaster or other acts of God, interruption of
the [name of League] Season... (emphasis added).
As drafted, the emphasized language provides the broadest coverage
possible with respect to the interruption of a League's season. Now,
consider the effect of this provision as commonly modified. Insert the
word "Regular" before season, and by definition you exclude the inter-
ruption of League playoffs. To cover that possibility, some will sandwich
Season between the words "Regular" and "Playoffs" so as to read "....
interruption of the League's Regular Season or Playoffs." The result of
such variation is to leave a licensee remediless against an interruption of
pre-season play. Add "Pre-Season" to the list, and the clause remains
ambiguous as to a cancellation of a League's All-Star event. For exam-
ple, the NFL's Pro-Bowl is neither part of the Pre-Season, Regular Sea-
son or Playoffs.43 All of the issues presented by this paragraph can be
avoided simply by using "Season" on a stand-alone basis. As to the dis-
tinctions between the Pre, Regular and Playoff Seasons, all are clearly
covered by the term "Season." As to events such as All-Star games,
inasmuch as each is typically a "scheduled" event on a League's season
41. AP News Wire Service, Apr. 28, 1995.
42. This was, in part, borne out by the decision by the Blue Jays' cable TV partner TSN
who advised that the team's usual 25 scheduled game broadcasts would not be carried by the
network because of the costs of producing Blue Jays' replacement games from Florida, a cir-
cumstance that itself was necessitated by Provincial labor law.
43. Arguably, the same can be said of the mid-season All-Star games staged by MLB, the
NBA and the NHL. These events, along with certain other regularly televised and sponsored
events such as the draft, do not fit neatly into the specified categories of "Pre-Season, Regular
Season or Playoffs."
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calendar-absent specification that renders them not susceptible to cate-
gorization-it would be extremely difficult to argue that they are not
part of the "Season."" As the foregoing illustrates, in this area, general
language is superior to specific language.
Finally, a licensee should insist upon force majeure protection
throughout the term of its agreement. Too often, when a licensee is ne-
gotiating an agreement during a period of labor instability, its focus will
be locked on the immediately threatened season. As a result, some
licensees will readily settle for a provision that provides protection for
the upcoming season. Unfortunately for such licensees, as the labor ne-
gotiating history of MLB, the NBA, NFL and NHL each demonstrate,
once a CBA expires, it often takes far in excess of a single season to
conclude a new pact.45 Consequently, for the MLB or NBA licensees
that accepted a provision that specifically provided relief in the event of
an interruption of the 1994 Season of each respective League, it found its
hard-won right extinguished by its terms when the MLB strike carried
over into the following season and the NBA's lock-out did not com-
mence until after the conclusion of its 1994-95 Season.
B. Triggering Devices
In addition to the coverage problems discussed above, there are a
number of other common drafting flaws that can render the applicability
of a force majeure provision ambiguous. Chief among them is the lan-
guage that triggers the protection of the provision.
Invariably, the right to invoke the labor-related clause of a force
majeure provision is based upon the occurrence of some specified event.
Unfortunately, some drafters will use as the triggering occurrence an
event or scenario that is expressed in vague or ambiguous terms. For
example:
If as a result of a labor dispute.., there is an interruption of any
commercial announcements to be telecast hereunder, which con-
tinues for a prolonged period of time... (emphasis added)
44. However, depending on the League in question, the status of the respective League's
drafts can present different analytical challenges. Whereas the NBA's draft takes place within
a few days of the conclusion of the NBA Finals, and is expressly deemed the final event of its
season for a number of purposes, the NHL and NFL drafts are scheduled several months after
the conclusion of their respective seasons. Accordingly, it would be an extreme stretch to
maintain that these events are part of their season.
45. For example, the NFL operated from 1987 to June 29, 1993 without a signed CBA.
NFL FACT BOOK, supra note 26, at 275, col. 4. The MLB took three years to reach a new
labor agreement, and the NBA conducted its last taro seasons without a signed CBA.
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or
If a material number of games cannot be broadcast because of...
strike... (emphasis added).
The injection of subjective terms provides fertile ground for good
faith disagreement. A pre-requisite condition, such as the loss of "mate-
rial number of games," in addition to being subjective, is necessarily a
relative term. What constitutes a "material number" depends on, among
other factors, the number of games in the particular season and number
of games covered by the particular agreement. For instance, if a regular
season is 162 games, a loss of several games may be de minimus. On the
other hand, if a broadcaster only has the right to broadcast a small frac-
tion of the total number of games in a season, the loss of even a few
games can be material.
In addition to the potential interpretation problems, use of subjective
terms and relative standards can force a licensor into having to take a
position with respect to one licensee that may operate to the licensor's
detriment vis-d-vis another licensee or, worse, inconsistent positions with
licensees. For example, in the area of game broadcasts Leagues and
teams invariably have multiple media outlets: an over-the-air TV carrier;
a cable TV station; and a radio broadcaster. Assuming the inclusion in
each broadcast agreement of an identical provision that conditions relief
upon the loss of a "material number" of games, even though the claim of
each licensee would arise from the same force majeure occurrence, the
materiality threshold could vary widely depending on the number of
broadcasts each carrier is authorized.46
46. The following baseball-based hypothetical illustrates this potentiality. For the strike-
shortened 1994 MLB regular season, a team grants the following rights: (a) to a radio station,
the right to broadcast all of its regular season games; (b) to a cable station, the right to televise
up to 100 games; and (c) to a "free TV" station, the right to televise 20 specific games. At the
point the Baseball Players' commenced their strike each team had played roughly 110 of its
scheduled 162 games. In total, approximately 50 games were lost resulting in each of the
team's three broadcasters losing the same number of scheduled game broadcasts-ten. Based
on such a scenario, it is easy to see how results may differ even though the force majeure
condition vis-d-vis each licensee is identical. As to the radio station, the loss of ten games (less
than 10% of its inventory) may not be a material number of games. As to the cable station,
the loss of ten dates is arguably a material number of games. As to the over-the-air rights
holder, the loss of ten games, 50% of its available inventory, is clearly a material loss of games.
If after three weeks of the work stoppage, the over-the-air broadcast partner sought relief
under the subject force majeure provision and the team agreed that the loss of games had been
material, then if either, or both, of the television broadcast partners shortly thereafter sought
that same relief, the team would find itself in the difficult position of having already deemed
the loss of games to have been material.
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Finally, in the event of a dispute over the availability of the remedy at
,a particular point in time, a party believing itself to have the right to
withhold certain performances based upon the force majeure can be
faced with the dilemma of either having to forego the opportunity to
mitigate the injury to its business at the earliest opportunity, or with-
holding performance at its peril. If a licensee fully performs during a
period when it may have properly withheld performance, it will likely
compound its losses.47 Conversely, if a licensee Withholds performance
over the objection of the licensor, and to the licensor's injury,48 the licen-
sor may terminate the agreement (which is an option incorporated into
many force majeure provisions) or even bring a claim based upon breach
of contract.
C. Tolling Clauses
Many force majeure provisions contain a clause that tolls the running
of the contract term and a concomitant clause that extends the agree-
ment for a period corresponding to the length of the work stoppage. The
following is representative of such clauses: "in the event of such delay,
interruption or diminution [as a result a force majeure], the Term of this
Agreement shall be extended for a period equal to the period of such
delay, interruption or diminution."
This type of relief can be attractive to both licensees and licensors.
Licensees receive the full benefit of the term of agreement for which
they bargained, and licensors enjoy guaranteed payments over an ex-
tended period and in compensation for a period in which it may have
received reduced or no revenues. At first blush, this would seem an eq-
uitable solution that would make whole the party seeking relief. How-
ever, such an ad hoc approach can have many unintended adverse
consequences for the licensor while providing no real benefit for the
licensee.
In the event of a lengthy work stoppage, an automatic extension for a
comparable period can severely hamstring a licensor's normal business
47. While force majeure was not at issue in WABC Radio, plaintiff faced just such a pre-
dicament. The station maintained, in essence, that it could only perform its broadcast obliga-
tions (i.e., airing replacement games) at a financial loss.
48. For example, the typical retail product license agreement requires that the licensee
contribute to a League-administered promotional fund that is used by the League to execute
advertising and promotion of League "Official Licensed Product." These funds are budgeted
well in advance of each season. The campaigns funded by these dollars have numerous "hard"
costs that the League would have to absorb in the event licensees wrongfully withheld their
contributions.
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practices and disrupt its business operations. Since the contract year for
the purposes of League and team agreements generally coincides with
the licensor's fiscal year (which usually coincides with it season),4 9 in a
case involving a prolonged interruption such as the MLB players' strike,
an agreement extension on the foregoing basis would add 232 days to the
term of the contract. As a consequence, the so-fixed expiration date
will, instead of ending proximate to the conclusion of their season, fall
some two months into a new season. Such an abrupt and unscheduled
ending can have significant adverse consequences to the licensor.
1. Leverage Considerations
The in-season expiration of any agreement is certain to severely re-
duce the negotiating leverage of the licensor in a number of ways. For
instance, in virtually every significant business or licensing category, be-
cause of the considerable lead time necessary to effectively enter a mar-
ket-whether it be a licensing category, corporate sponsorship of a
newly acquired property or producing broadcasts-the licensor will be
faced with the inescapable reality that if it does not renew the incum-
bent, there will be some period of transition when it will have to conduct
business without the benefit of the services and revenue provided by the
non-renewed party. The inability to reach renewal of certain types of
agreements can have disastrous consequences for the League or team.
For example, in the case of a broadcast agreement that expires in-season,
if a renewal cannot be reached with the incumbent broadcast partner,
the League or team may find itself without a carrier for its games.50 This
would be doubly disastrous because, in addition to the loss of the broad-
cast outlet, the licensor might then be unable to perform the media
placement obligations owed to various corporate sponsors. Because the
risk of loss in such key areas as broadcasting and sponsorship of certain
promotions (e.g., All-Star balloting) or licensor-controlled television
programming may be unacceptable, the licensor may be forced to accept
49. For example, an NBA "Contract Year" is a 12-month accounting period that com-
mences August 1st and concludes July 31st, the same as its fiscal year, encompassing a full
exhibition, regular and playoff season (a period that runs from October through June).
50. It should be noted that, because it is quite common for broadcast partners and corpo-
rate sponsors to have exclusive negotiation windows contained in their agreements, a licensor
may be contractually prohibited from even discussing the sale of rights to another party until
the 11th-hour of the agreement in effect. Moreover, if a licensee has a right of first refusal, the
licensor may be unable to find a party willing to negotiate for the available rights under the
circumstances.
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considerably less fees than it could command for the same rights, if up
for negotiation at the end of a season or during the off-season.
As in the broadcast agreement context, the advent of an in-season
expiration can drastically alter the negotiating leverage in the merchan-
dise licensing arena. Given the new end-of-term months covered by an
8-month extension, coupled with the standard 90-day sell-off period at a
minimum, a licensee up for renewal goes into negotiations knowing that,
in the event terms of renewal cannot be reached, it will have the benefit
of selling through the critically important selling windows of: (i) start of
season; (ii) the All-Star period; and (ii) the all important "back-to-
school" period.51 Perhaps even through the equally important Christmas
selling season. 2 This gives the licensee a significant negotiating advan-
tage. The incumbent licensee, the licensor and any potential competitor
for the license will all recognize that because of the foregoing sales
rights, the rights of any licensee other than the incumbent will be seri-
ously devalued for its first contract year. Indeed, given that, manufactur-
ers that might otherwise vie for a particular license may opt not to enter
into contention because the licensor cannot deliver a "clean" category.
If an incumbent licensee is in effect "running unopposed," its leverage is
clearly enhanced.
2. Benefits?
For the reasons detailed above, a lengthy extension of an agreement
can be of greater detriment than benefit to a licensor. In a similar vain,
the extension of the term of a contract may be of minimal value to a
licensee under various circumstances. Depending on the part of the sea-
son lost to a work stoppage, the extension of a license for a correspond-
ing period may leave a licensee far from whole and without any effective
relief.
As a result of the August 12th walkout by the Major League Baseball
Players, the 1994 playoffs and World Series were ultimately canceled.
As a consequence, baseball experienced massive fan disillusionment that
left MLB licensees and sponsors unable to maximize their rights during
the peak period of fan interest-the pennant races and the World Series.
51. "Back-to-school" is the second-biggest shopping season of the year, second only to the
Christmas holiday-shopping period. Alice Z. Cuneo, Back-to-School 'Season' Gets Extended
Spending, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 23, 1996, at 16. Indeed, for apparel manufacturers, the
back-to-school season is even bigger than the Christmas shopping season. Donna Rosato,
Shopping Season Off to Slow Start, USA TODAY, Aug. 14, 1995, at lB.
52. It is fairly common for licensees with significant minimum payment guarantees to suc-
cessfully negotiate extended sell-off periods.
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Deprived of that heightened period of interest, and with the strike's ill
effects carrying through the holiday season, many rights holders suffered
irreparable harm to their business. League (and many team) broadcast
partners and advertisers lost the opportunity to reach the largest viewer
audiences of the season, corporate sponsors lost their most important
promotional platform, and licensees watched their business free-fall.
Licensees, in particular, were perhaps the hardest hit. For most licen-
sees, particularly in the apparel categories, the majority of their sales are
made during the final months of the season (a period which overlaps the
back-to-school buying season) together with the Christmas shopping
season.
53
Sponsors and licensees of the NHL found themselves in a position
similar to that of their MLB counterparts. With the owners' October 1st
lock-out of its players, and the warnings and threats that preceded it,
hockey's business partners, like baseball's, were unable to capitalize on
several periods of heightened attention: the Season's opening and the
unique circumstances surrounding it;54 and the All-Star lead-in. More-
over, as was the case with the baseball strike, the consequences of the
lock-out were felt by licensees for a period extending from back-to-
school through the holiday shopping season.
Given the timing of both the MLB and NHL work stoppages, the
addition of 232 or 75 days (as the case may be) to an agreement is hardly
salve for some wounds. To a corporate sponsor or merchandise licensee,
the addition to their contract term of days that will run in the off-season
is of little or no value. For the sponsor, there are no games to advertise
in and no available platform upon which to build any promotion. As for
merchandise licensees, there is no adequate substitute for a lost Christ-
mas season or special event opportunity such as the All-Star game. For a
marketing partner that has been severely injured, an extension under the
foregoing circumstances is a hollow remedy-if it is one's sole remedy.
Indeed, for licensees in some product category segments, an extension
may prove to be no remedy at all. Given the extent of lost sales during a
work stoppage coupled with the residual fan disaffection,"5 loss of popu-
53. See supra note 51.
54. The return of the Stanley Cup to New York (the media and advertising center of
North America) for the first time in over 50 years and the lack of competition with the base-
ball playoffs and World Series as a result of their own work stoppage.
55. By baseball's own account, 38% of its fans are angry and 58% are "disgusted." THE
SPORTS Bus. DArY, Dec. 9, 1996, at #11 (quoting the MLB Enterprises CEO, Greg Murphy,
state of MLB marketing address at the 1996 MLB winter meetings). This disaffection is also
readily evident in post-strike attendance and television viewership figures. For example, at-
[Vol. 7:427
SUDDEN DEATH: LEAGUE LABOR DISPUTES...
larity compared to other sports, and failing League promotional sup-
port,5 6 a licensee may be unable to meet its minimum royalty payment
obligation to the League even with an extension. For example, in the
trading card category where baseball accounts for about half of all cards
sales, in the immediate aftermath of the strike, the Topps Company-the
market leader with a $1.2 billion card business-experienced a third-
quarter earnings dive of 68%5 7 saw its fourth-quarter net income down
by 77%58 and its first quarter sales decline by close to $30 million.59 In
that case, the licensee's damages will have been compounded, as it will
have lost sales, and will be required to pay "out of pocket" to meet its
minimum payment guaranty.
3. Operation Concerns
As discussed in the first subsection, long-term contract extensions re-
sulting from a work stoppage can materially affect the business decision-
making process. They can also severely disturb normal business opera-
tendance for the strike-shortened 1995 MLB Season was down approximately 19% league-
wide. See generally Phillips, Ballpark Figures Slide, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 1995, at 3 C; Tom
Verducci, Basebalk The Bad News, SPORTS ILLuSTRATED, July 10, 1995, at 32. Television
viewership was also down sharply. See generally Rudy Martzke, All-Star Ratings Take Nose-
dive, USA TODAY, July 13, 1995, at 2C (reporting that the national TV ratings for the 1995
All-Star Game was an all-time low since the telecast was moved to prime-time in 1967). In-
deed, two full seasons after the strike, the 1996 All-Star Game posted a second consecutive
record low TV rating. Baseball All-Star Game Plummets to Lowest Rating, USA TODAY, July
11, 1996, at 2C. The 1996 World Series ratings were down 9% from the low-rated 1995 Series,
making the '96 Series the third least-watched Series in history. Rudy Martzke, Sports on TV,
USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 1996, at 2C; Erik Brady, Series Ratings 14% Behind Last Season's, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 1996, at 4C (projecting final Series ratings based on then to-date ratings for
games 1 through 4). The 1996 ratings are even more disappointing in view of the two large
television markets involved and a "dream" match-up between the defending world champion
Atlanta Braves against the most storied franchise in American sports, the New York Yankees.
56. See David Leonhardt, Baseball's Slump is Far From Over, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 4, 1996, at
82; see also Andy Bernstein, Can Baseball Be Cool Again?, SPORTING GoODs Bus., June,
1996, at 52.
57. Nancy J. Kim, Checked Swings, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at Section C.
58. Richard Sandomir, The Players Are Back, But Are Card Collectors?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
13, 1995, at B14.
59. Topps net sales for its first quarter ending May 27, 1995 were $67,432,000, down from
$94,498,000 in 1994. Topps First Quarter Sales Down Close to $30M From Last Year, THE
SPORTS Bus. DAILY, June 16, 1995, at 1 (citing Topps press release). Almost two years after
the baseball players walkout, the trading card industry is still suffering from the ill effects of
the strike. According to one industry executive, even though the baseball card business was,
by some estimates, down by as much as 50% in 1995, THE SPORTS Bus. DAILY, July 1, 1996, at
3 (quoting television interview of Brian Burr, the president of the Upper Deck Company, on
ESPN's SportsCenter, June 28, 1996), sales of a number of the leading cards brands "have not
increased at all" and have "probably decreased." Id. (quoting collectibles executive Norm
Klemonski).
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tional matters. As noted above, it is generally broadcast partners, spon-
sors and "key" licensees that have force majeure protection in their
agreements. This class of marketing partners typically accounts for a dis-
proportionate percentage of a League or team's non-gate revenues. If
these partners, as a class, receive extensions, it can create a myriad of
operational complications. For instance, with large advertising and pro-
motion contributions being held in abeyance, budgeting becomes diffi-
cult. Similarly, continuing royalty reporting and payments makes
revenue forecasting difficult. And, lastly, in view of the foregoing, clos-
ing the books on the fiscal year becomes a problem which in turn raises
share holder issues because Leagues are normally required to make their
annual distribution to their shareholders (i.e., the teams) within a time-
certain following the close of the fiscal year.
As illustrated above, while the equitable extension of an agreement
may be a mutually satisfactory form of relief and, equally important, be a
compromise that is easily reached, such relief should not be settled upon
without full consideration and appreciation of all of its repercussions.
D. Damages
Unless a licensee's damages are apparent, such as with a broadcaster
that is unable to air games, or an in-game TV advertiser whose commer-
cials cannot be run, because of a work stoppage, the licensor should in-
corporate into its force majeure provision a damage requirement. While
a strike or lock-out will undoubtedly have an adverse affect on anyone
involved with the particular sport, every work stoppage does not neces-
sarily have such a severe economic impact upon a licensee as to justify
any extraordinary relief. For instance, the work stoppage may have been
de minimus like the recent July 1996 lock-out of players by the NBA
which lasted a mere few hours,60 or the 2-day walkout by the Major
League Baseball Players at the start of the 1985 season. Alternatively, it
may have occurred late in the season at a point when a licensee has al-
ready met its minimum payment obligation or during the off-season
when its direct affects are muted.
Because the "purpose of a force majeure clause is to limit dam-
ages,"' 61 and a work stoppage does not necessarily result in a licensee
sustaining any significant damages, a licensee should not be permitted to
60. David DuPree, On-, Off-Again NBA Lockout Stalls Signings, USA TODAY, July 10,
1996, at IC.
61. United Equities Co. v. First Nat. City Bank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1st Dept. 1976), affd
mem, 41 N.Y.2d 1032, 363 N.E.2d 1385 (1977).
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invoke such a provision without meeting some damage standard. Fur-
ther, the standard should include the notion of materiality, particularly
under a merchandise license, because a licensee cannot truly be said to
have been damaged, at least not in the "frustration" of expectation
sense,62 if it has been able to meet its minimum payment guarantee
which, after all, is based on the sales projections provided by the licen-
see. Without such a standard, a license may use the event of a work
stoppage as a pretext to renegotiate more favorable terms or gain some
other concession, notwithstanding the fact that it may have already met
(or be able to meet) its minimum. Therefore, it is recommended that a
licensor include in its force majeure provision a clause that provides that
relief is only available if the work stoppage "has had a material adverse
affect on the sale of the Licensed Products." A final rebuttal argument
in support of a materiality standard is philosophical. A licensor should
not be a guarantor of a manufacturer's level of profitability with respect
to product it licenses. If a licensee has met, or can meet, its minimum
guarantee, then a fortiori it has profited on its license.
Concededly, the term "material" is subjective and subjective terms
should be avoided in the drafting process. However, unlike the
problems discussed above with respect to subjective language, in this one
context, materiality is easily determined. Since a merchandise licensee is
typically required by contract to submit regular periodic sales state-
ments, its sales can simply be compared to its sales figures for a compa-
rable period of the past season (or several seasons) or to even the last
pre-work stoppage accounting period. As an alternative to the inclusion
of an explicit materiality standard, the parties may elect to include a du-
rational requirement upon the elapse of which material damage is pre-
sumed. The following type of clause has such an affect: "if any such
[force majeure] event prevents performance for a period of time in ex-
cess of sixty (60) days, either party may terminate this agreement upon
written notice."
V. DRAFT CHOICES
While many licensors and licensees tend to view a force majeure pro-
vision as simply part of the boilerplate, if included at all, this is the first
provision the parties will review at the hint of any potential work stop-
page. In the event of a work stoppage, the obligations of each party will
be dictated by the terms of such provision. Accordingly, each party
62. Id.
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should be as attentive to the language of this clause as they are to the so-
called "business terms" of their agreement. The well-drafted sports force
majeure provision should be based upon thorough consideration of the
following elements: (i) scope of coverage; (ii) triggering event; and (iii)
type of relief. This section discusses the critical considerations relative to
these clauses and recommends drafting solutions that avoid the common
pitfalls.
A. Scope of Coverage & Triggers
Obviously, the scope of coverage is the most critical element of any
force majeure provision because it is dispositive on the issue of a party's
rights in the event of a labor disputes. Licensees should request a
broadly worded provision covering all of the traditional force majeures
(e.g., acts of God, war, fire, governmental restriction, carrier failure, etc.)
as well as specific protection against all forms of League labor disputes.
A licensor may, however, justifiably resist such broad coverage. Such
expansive coverage can be fairly viewed as an attempt to shift certain
business risks that are customarily borne by a licensee. For example,
with respect to apparel manufacturers, for many major licensees a signif-
icant percentage of their business is attributable to their sale of branded
merchandise 63- and in some cases, even a majority of their overall busi-
ness64 -and for which they should assume all force majeure risk. Thus,
for such manufacturers, a request for broad coverage can be seen as a
"grab;" an effort to shift certain inherent business risks, that in all other
contexts the licensee assumes sole responsibility for, to a party that may
be willing to share them for no compelling reason.
A frequent compromise is to limit force majeure protection to strikes.
Content with having extracted any concession on protection against
strikes, some licensees will rest. However, as discussed in Section III(B)
above, to do so is a grave mistake. If the grantor is a League or team
and has consented to include a Strike Clause, then the licensee will have
gained the high ground in negotiating this particular provision. A licen-
63. For example, NIKE, Champion, Russell and Starter to name a few. Indeed, branded
product is one of the "hottest" areas in apparel sales. Kim-Van Dang, Brand News, SPORT-
STYLE, Feb., 1996, at 82.
64. For example, several large publicly traded companies are involved in team sport li-
censing: textile giant, VF Corporation, through its subsidiaries Nutmeg Mills and Cutler
Sports, holds a number of League merchandise licenses as well as being the maker of the
famous "Lee" brand of jeans; the same is true of Fruit of the Loom, best-known for its under-
wear business but also owns Pro Players among other sports licensing companies; and uniform
and apparel maker Champion Products is owned by frozen food giant Sara Lee Corporation.
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see should then insist upon specific protection against lock-out. Having
acknowledged the appropriateness of work stoppage relief by virtue of
the agreement to include a Strike Clause, the licensor is left with no
principled reason for not further extending coverage to lock-out if the
licensee requests such protection. The cogent argument that follows is
that if the licensor consents to protection against a player strike, it can
hardly object to extending similar protection to a lock-out; a situation of
the League's own making and a matter exclusively within its control.
To avoid any potential ambiguity, the well-drafted Sports FM
enumeration should explicitly refer to strikes or lock-outs in which the
League is involved. Consistent with the particular form of provision and
style employed by the drafter, the following language is suggested to
provide for excuse (or suspension) of a party's performance as a result of
"strike or lock-out to which the League is party." This sample language
will avert the myriad interpretation/construction problems discussed
above. The language by its terms expressly applies to both player strike
and lock-out as well as covering any disputes involving League officiat-
ing personnel. Moreover, it removes any uncertainty as to the affect of
the use of replacements. Since a strike or lock-out is a prerequisite to
the use of replacements, relief will be available to a party under a so-
drafted provision notwithstanding the fact that no work stoppage or in-
terruption of the season may exist, or may have been de minimus. If the
League wishes to reserve the right to utilize replacements and receive
full performance from its licensee (or otherwise provide for some form
of modified performance), the drafter should expressly carve out the
terms and conditions. If on the other hand, the licensee wishes to be
protected against labor disputes involving non-League personnel as well,
then the sample language should be modified as follows: "strike or lock-
out (including those to which the League is party)..."65
Finally, in addition to the foregoing benefits of using the recom-
mended language, use of the words strike and lock-out provide ideal
triggering events. They are objectively determinable events that are not
65. If a party's performance obligations are heavily dependent upon services provided by
an organized labor force, such as broadcasters who are necessarily dependent upon camer-
amen, engineers, electricians and the like, then such general protection should be desirable.
Indeed, last year, only a 12th hour agreement reached between the Canadian Broadcast Com-
pany and its major unions averted "the largest strike in the history of the CBC." Adrienne
Tanner, Deals Met, CBC Strike Averted, THE GAZETTE (Montreal), May 24, 1996, at A7. A
strike that would have crippled all CBC operations. Christopher Harris, Focus at CBC Shifts
to Cutbacks: Deal With Unions Lifts Strike Threat, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, May 25, 1996,
at Al, All. Such a strike would have affected NHL playoff coverage in Canada.
1997]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
susceptible to dispute over the point at which a party may properly in-
voke the force majeure provision. Moreover, these events often provide
early warning in that the effective date of these occurrences is typically
preceded by an announcement of a deadline.
B. Type of Relief
A force majeure provision, like any athletic protective equipment,
can only provide the user with maximum protection if it fits. These pro-
visions come in a number of different configurations; one-size does not
fit all. To ensure adequate protection, it is essential that the formn of
relief provided is fitted to the nature of a licensee's obligations, to its
business and to practical realities.
Force majeure provisions commonly provide for one or more of the
following forms of relief: (i) excuse of performance; (ii) suspension of
performance; (iii) right of termination; (iii) credit, or rebate; or (iv) equi-
table adjustment.
1. Excuse vs. Suspension
A typical form of force majeure clause that excuses performance pro-
vides in pertinent part as follows:
If either party hereto shall have been prevented in whole, or in
part, from performing its obligations hereunder by virtue of acts
beyond the reasonable control of the party including, but not lim-
ited to, acts of war, fire, natural disaster or other acts of God,
then the obligation of such party shall be excused... (emphasis
added).
Suspension-type force majeure provisions are similarly constructed.
The following is typical:
Neither party shall be deemed in default of any obligation under
this Agreement to the extent that such default results from acts of
God, strike, fire, flood, acts of the public enemy or other Force
Majeure causes; provided that all performances affected by said
Force Majeure shall be suspended during the currency of such
cause; and provided that the obligor shall resume the perform-
ance of its obligations in good faith as soon as possible... (em-
phasis added).
While excusal and suspension effect the same immediate result-the
discharge of a party from the performance of a present obligation-
these two forms of relief are not equivalents.
In drafting a force majeure provision, the words "excuse" and "sus-
pend" should not be used loosely, and only with full consideration of the
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import of the term used. Whereas suspension merely postpones per-
formance for a period of time, excuse permanently discharges a party
from the affected specific obligation. The failure to take into account
this hyper-technical distinction can have significant repercussions. It can
mean the difference between receiving an expected benefit late, and not
receiving the benefit at all.
2. Right of Termination
As an alternative to the foregoing forms of relief, a licensor can elect
to provide a right of termination in the event a force majeure condition
prevents a party's performance for a specified period. A typical form of
this type of provision provides in pertinent part that "if any such [force
majeure] event prevents performance for a period of time in excess of
sixty (60) days, either party may terminate this agreement upon written
notice." Some licensees may view such a termination right as an ade-
quate remedy inasmuch as it allows a party a means of complete dis-
charge. Because of the "out" this provides, and given that a licensee can
rightly consider it a major achievement to have extracted a concession
on force majeure at all, many licensees will accept such relief if proffered
without further negotiation. While a licensee should be pleased at pre-
vailing on the macro issue of work stoppage relief, a licensee should not
be so quick to acquiesce as to this particular form of relief. As discussed
below, this form of relief may not be suitable for a particular company.
If the decision to provide a licensee with a right to terminate as its
sole form of relief reflects a strategic choice on the part of the licensor, it
is a shrewd gambit. This approach preserves for the licensor the full
performance by the licensee through the currency of a strike or lock-out
(at least until a specified length of time, which can be quite significant)-
a fact that a licensee should consider-while providing relief that is, as
discussed below, somewhat specious.
At first blush, it may seem that providing a right of termination puts
a licensor at considerable risk. In reality, the risk of actual termination is
relatively remote for several reasons. First, by the terms of the provi-
sion, relief may not be available even in the event of a work stoppage.
The option to terminate is contingent upon the continuation of a strike
or lock-out for more than the specified period. That period can be as
long as mutually agreed: 60 days, 90 days, or even longer. It is worth
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noting, that only twice in the approximately 40-year history of PAs has a
work stoppage continued for more than a 60-day period.66
Second, a licensee is unlikely to take advantage of the right to termi-
nate (if the durational requirement has been met) because business real-
ity militates against taking such a drastic measure. Typically, the only
licensees able to secure protection against a player strike or owner lock-
out are sponsors and a League's most substantial (in terms of royalties
generated) merchandise licensees. Invariably, these types of licensees
fall into three categories. In one category are those companies whose
brands are synonymous with a particular sport such as NIKE with bas-
ketball, the ubiquitous CCM and Bauer brands in hockey, or Topps with
baseball. In a second category are companies whose overall sales are
disproportionately dependent upon the sale of the licensed product of a
particular sport - again, such as Topps with baseball cards. Falling
within the third category are so-called "authentics" licensees, whose
overall sales are driven by a particular League's endorsement or use of
their signature product such as an "official" game jersey manufacturer
like Champion, or a game ball supplier like Wilson (NFL footballs) or
Spalding (NBA basketballs). For these types of companies, to give-up
their license is not a real alternative. For Topps to exit the baseball card
business would be suicidal; if a company like Spalding gave up its
designation as the supplier of the "Official Game Ball of the NBA," its
market share in the basketball category would likely plummet. In view
of these often symbiotic relationships, it is highly improbable that any
so-situated licensee would opt to terminate its League license.
Finally, even if a licensee is inclined to terminate its agreement, a
licensor would still have an unarticulated fall-back position that makes
termination unlikely. Upon notice of termination, a licensor can simply
offer other forms of relief such as excusing or suspending the party's
performance, extending the term of the license, or reducing minimum
payment guarantees or rights fees. Given such concessions, the
probability of a licensee resigning its license is virtually zero.
Not every licensee has the same amount of negotiating leverage. A
licensee with minimal royalty guarantees, or whose royalties can easily
be replaced by another (or new) licensee, that requests protection
against a work stoppage may well be offered the above form of relief on
a "take it or leave it" basis. The most common mistake made by a licen-
see confronted with this set of circumstances is to assume that there is
nothing negotiable. While a licensor may be steadfast as to the basic
66. The 1994 baseball strike and hockey lock-out.
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form of relief it has chosen, there may still be areas within the provision
that are negotiable. A licensee should request interim relief such as ex-
cuse or the suspension of performance during the waiting period. More-
over, the licensor may be willing to reduce the "waiting period" from 60
days to 30 days. For the licensee, it should be noted that four out of the
last five League work stoppages have lasted more than 30 days.67 If the
licensor has already agreed that work stoppage relief is warranted, then
it will likely exhibit some flexibility on these micro points.68 However,
such concessions will not be volunteered. A licensee must specifically
request such further modifications.
If, in the end, the licensor opts for the right of termination as the
form of relief, the termination option should not be left open-ended, as
is in the above-cited provision. The option should be made exercisable
within a time-certain following the elapse of the specified period of disa-
bility. The following type of clause is recommended: "if any such [force
majeure] event prevents performance for a period of time in excess of
sixty (60) days, either party may terminate this agreement upon thirty
(30) days' written notice served upon the other party not later than ten (10)
days after the elapse of the 60-day period" (emphasis added). This addi-
tional language will prevent a licensee from using the force majeure as a
pretext for terminating an agreement that it comes to view as unfavora-
ble, or from using the threat of termination as a "re-opener" device.
Moreover, a fixed deadline will force the licensee to make a timely de-
termination and permit the licensor to proceed forward, either one way
or another, with a needed degree of certainty.
3. Credit or Rebate
As mentioned, a particular form of relief may not be suited for a
particular licensee or types of business. For example, the mere right to
terminate is not a meaningful choice for a licensee whose business is
dependent upon a specific license. An incremental extension of an
agreement's term can be meaningless for some licensees. For a licensee
that is thinly capitalized or has a heavy debt burden, a requirement to
fully perform during the pendency of a work stoppage can be crippling.
On the other hand, to permit certain types of licensees to suspend their
67. The most recent baseball strike, the hockey lock-out, the 1982 Football Players strike
and the 1981 baseball strike.
68. Indeed, if the licensor is willing to accommodate the licensee on these further modifi-
cations, it may well elect to reverse itself and simply provide the licensee with a suspension-
type relief since the net effect will be the same, and the licensor would not have to expose
itself to the risk of licensee termination.
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performance could be disastrous for the licensor. Into this last category
falls "key" sponsors and broadcast partners in particular.
Unlike merchandise licenses where the rights granted are bundled
and indivisible (e.g., right to manufacture, distribute, sell and promote
Licensed Product), the elements of a sponsorship agreement (e.g., use of
trademarks and "Official Sponsor" designation in advertising, specific
promotion rights, purchase of League-controlled media, etc.) or broad-
cast agreement are severable. Moreover, unlike royalty payments which
are based on actual sales and generally payable on a monthly basis,
sponsorship rights fees are typically allocated to specific elements and
payable in relatively large installments that are fewer and farther be-
tween than royalty payments. If such substantial fees were withheld or
diminished, it would severely impact a licensor's ability to meet its oper-
ational expenses as well as other financial commitments. Accordingly, as
to "cash cow" licensees, excuse or suspension of certain performances
should be avoided. Thus, in the first instance, the licensor should offer
relief in the form of a rights fee credit or other forms of credit.
From a licensor's perspective, agreement by a licensee to accept a
credit or rebate in lieu of other relief is an extremely licensor-favorable
resolution of the relief issue: full payment is ensured through the work
stoppage; the relief afforded is all post-stoppage; and the relief does not
require any out-of-pocket payment. While such a resolution can be eq-
uitable, a licensee may balk nonetheless. The discerning sponsor or
broadcast partner is likely to find such a proposal unsatisfactory for a
number of reasons.
First, depending on the point in the term of the agreement that the
work stoppage occurs, there may not be a guaranteed subsequent season
in which to apply the credit; for instance, if a strike occurs in the final
year of an agreement. Secondly, for a myriad of reasons, comparable
advertising inventory or promotional opportunities may not be available
in a subsequent season. For instance, some sponsored events are not
available on an annual basis such as the NBA's McDonald's Champion-
ship-a pre-season tournament played abroad and featuring the reigning
NBA champions team in tournament play against championship teams
representing various foreign basketball leagues-which is staged every
other year. Other events, such as League all-star games, are hosted by
different cities each year and therefore can have differing promotional
value for a particular sponsor. Other opportunities are truly unique,
such as a League anniversary season like the NFL's recent diamond an-
niversary or the NBA's current 50th anniversary season. Finally, oppor-
tunities may not be available simply because of prior commitments made
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by the licensor to other sponsors or advertisers. Moreover, in the case of
corporate sponsors, companies routinely review marketing plans weigh-
ing costs against effectiveness and decide alternative promotional activi-
ties will be more efficient and therefore change their marketing focus.
In addition to the foregoing reasons why a licensee may find make-
goods unattractive, make-goods may be of little value to certain licen-
sees, given the potential for severe diminished interest in the sport fol-
lowing a prolonged work stoppage. This was evident by the lagging
attendance69 and reduced TV viewership experienced by MLB last sea-
son.7" For a broadcast partner that has been left with unsold advertising
inventory as a result of a work stoppage, or has been forced to deeply
discount its ad rates, the last thing it will want is additional units to sell
or games to broadcast.7'
Faced with a cool response to the offer of credit, the licensor's fall-
back is to combine the offer of credit with one or more additional forms
of relief. The usual alternative is to combine credit with the option to
terminate and/or receive a rebate. The following form of construction is
typical:
If the performance of either party shall be delayed, interrupted or
diminished by any cause beyond its reasonable control, such as
war, national emergency, fire, restrictions imposed by law, natural
disaster or other acts of God, Grantor may in its sole discretion
69. See supra note 55. While it must be noted that the average attendance for the 1996
season, 26,804 fans per game, was the fourth-highest in MLB history and represented a 6.1%
increase over the 1995 season average, it was still more than 4000 less fans per game than the
1994 pre-strike average. Attendance Is Up, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 1996, at 7C.
70. See supra note 55. The majority of MLB's 30 teams saw an increase in local television
viewership over 1995 levels. Michael Freeman,... A Long Way to Go, MEDIAWEEK, Sept. 23,
1996, at 4. This increase in viewership was fueled largely by a record-setting season of home
runs and a wild-card system that kept more than half of the teams in playoff contention well
into September. See Mark Starr, Diamond Jubilee, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1996, at 78. Only 11
teams "managed to creep back up to the same or similar rating netted before the strike,"
meaning that 12 teams have lost ratings from last season and 19 have still not recovered to
where they were in 1993. MEDIAWEEK, supra at 4. Nationally, television ratings are even
dimmer. Id.
71. Indeed, two full seasons after the 1994 baseball strike, at the conclusion of the 1996
MLB regular season, Fox Sports had only sold 75% of its ad time for the upcoming World
Series and felt it necessary to cut the price of a 30-second ad by $75,000. World Series Just Got
$75G Cheaper, Id. at 3. With ad time still available as of the start of the series, remaining
inventory was further discounted by another $25,000. See Rudy Martzke, Sports on TV, USA
TODAY, Oct. 17, 1996, at 2C. The saleability of the World Series, the crown jewel of baseball's
events, stands in sharp contrast to ad sales for the 1997 Super Bowl, also on Fox. Fox sold out
all 58 available 30-second ad slots (at a rate of $1.2 million a spot, up from $1.1 million from
the previous year) three weeks in advance of the game. Dottie Enrico, Super Bowl Ad Roster
Filled at $1.2 Million a Spot, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1997, at lB.
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(i) terminate this Agreement, pro rate the fees due to the time of
termination, and neither party shall be under any further obliga-
tion to the other; or (ii) apply a pro rata credit or make-good.
A good strategy in some cases is to first offer the licensee the right of
termination as the alternative form of relief. The reasons are twofold.
First, the return of funds is to be avoided if at all possible. Secondly,
neither a broadcaster nor a sponsor in a highly competitive product cate-
gory (and whose target consumers are efficiently delivered by a league's
programming such as the case in the soft drink, malt beverage and ath-
letic footwear categories) is likely to exercise the right to terminate for
many of the same types of reasons discussed in the above subsection
with respect to authentics licensees.
If a rebate is to be provided, to avoid any potential dispute regarding
the amount of the rebate, the provision should provide for a means of
calculating the refund. This can be achieved by incorporating a formula
such as: (a) number of opportunities lost (e.g., games, weeks of play),
(b) divided by a base number that is equal to the total number of oppor-
tunities, (c) multiplied by the annual rights fee due, (d) the sum of which
equals the amount of the rebate. The following examples are illustrative
of this approach:
# Games Lost (8)
x Annual Rights Fee ($1,000,000) =
Total # Games in Season (16)
Amount of the Rebate
($500,000)
or
# Weeks Lost (6)
x Annual Rights Fee ($1,000,000) =
Total Weeks in Season (24)
Amount of the Rebate
($250,000)
To minimize the revenue placed at-risk, a licensor should include
some type of "cap" device. Such a mechanism might include providing
that a refund will only be available if a designated percentage of games
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are canceled and, further limiting the amount to a pro rata portion of the
rights fee payments and capped at a designated percentage of the fee.72
Formulas can be structured in any number of different ways.
However, whatever formula is adopted should be tailored to the mutual
agreement of the parties and take into account the particular rights
granted, the nature of the performance obligations, and the fee structure
and payment schedule involved.
4. Equitable Adjustment
In contrast to the credit/rebate form of relief that is particularly
suited for sponsors and broadcasters, and wholly unsuitable for many
types of licensing arrangements, equitable adjustment is a form of relief
that is universally applicable and particularly fitting for merchandise
licensees. The following is typical of a force majeure provision that pro-
vides for such relief:
[i]n the event of a strike or lock-out ("Work Stoppage") involving
the League and its players that causes the pre-emption, in whole
or in part, of the Season, all obligations of LICENSEE hereunder
shall continue, including all payment obligations, and when such
Work Stoppage has ceased, if such Work Stoppage has had a ma-
terial adverse affect on LICENSEE's Licensed Product sales, LI-
CENSOR and LICENSEE shall in good faith confer with each
other to negotiate with respect to an equitable adjustment to LI-
CENSEE's obligations hereunder.
From a licensor's perspective, this is the optimal form of force
majeure relief. It requires full performance through the duration of the
work stoppage; relief, if warranted, is post-stoppage; and it provides the
licensor with the maximum amount of flexibility to fashion appropriate
relief.
The flexibility such provision provides is perhaps its most attractive
feature. By not locking into particular relief, it affords the parties the
latitude to customize the relief to their specific circumstances. This can
actually be more advantageous to a licensee than prescribed relief be-
cause it provides the licensee with a contractual basis to press for what
72. Capping devices can also be applied within the retail licensing context. Under a retail
licensing arrangement, one possible approach to limit the extent of any required reduction in
the minimum guarantee, and provided the license calls for scheduled minimum installment
payments throughout the contract year, is to (i) provide that the mechanism be only triggered
by the loss of a minimum number of games, and (ii) cap the maximum amount of the
reduction to a designated percentage of the minimum guarantee, and then require licensee to
only pay earned royalties on sales in excess of the reduced minimum guarantee.
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may be more useful relief under the prevailing circumstances. As dis-
cussed above, a licensee can come to find that a right of termination is
useless or that an extension will still not enable it to meet its minimum
royalty payment guarantee. With the flexibility provided by this type of
provision, a full menu of relief is available that can include more desira-
ble relief options such as product additions, reduction of minimum guar-
antees or advertising support, or cross collateralization of royalty
payments.
Notwithstanding some of the advantages that the above form of relief
can provide a licensee, a licensee may oppose this type of provision for
precisely the same reasons licensors find it desirable: the relief is post-
stoppage and is not assured. However, because the most valued market-
ing relationships are typically long-term, and often long-standing, there
is a built-in element of self-policing that militates against any grossly in-
equitable adjustment. Moreover, a prophylactic can be added by tying
the equitable adjustment provision to an arbitration clause. In this way,
the parties can avail themselves of an expedient, and cost-efficient, dis-
pute resolution mechanism in the event the parties cannot reach agree-
ment on the extent of the adjustment.
VI. THE POINT AFTER
The MLB and NHL work stoppages in particular have had a
profound impact on sports marketing relationships. The enduring aspect
of their strife has been to shock Leagues, players and their marketing
partners into the realization that true licensing disaster is possible. This
realization should forever after make parties to a pro sports licensing
arrangement routinely take such possibilities into consideration in their
negotiations. As a result of licensee consolidation through corporate ac-
quisition,73 the steady movement of the Leagues towards the "less is
more" philosophy and "marketing partner" model,74 and ever-increasing
League creation of controlled media and special events, allows major
73. For example: VF Corporation owns Nutmeg Mills and Cutler Sports; Rusell owns The
Game and Chalkline; Fruit of the Loom owns Salem Sportswear, Pro Player and Artex; NIKE
owns Sports Specialties and Bauer; and Tultex owns Logo Athletics and Discus Athletics.
74. That is, having fewer overall merchandise licensees and sponsors but in turn requiring
those selected companies to make substantially greater commitments and investments in the
licensor's sport. McGee, supra note 11; Nichols et al., The 1994 Annual Industry Report,
TEAM LICENSING Bus., May 1994, at 18, 26. In many instances, the financial commitment of
some merchandise licensees now rivals that of corporate sponsors-the long favored partici-
pants in a League's licensing program (because of their in-game advertising in national broad-
casts and national consumer promotions).
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licensees now to enjoy the greatest negotiating leverage since the dawn
of sports licensing. Given this, the Leagues must be prepared to share
some financial risk, and should be more willing to bargain on the issue of
force majeure protection.
In dealing with such matters, counsel must recognize that each licens-
ing situation is unique and must be approached as such. A multi-League
and entertainment property license holder can divert resources (e.g.,
production capacity, raw material, etc.) to the production of other mer-
chandise in ways a single license holder cannot. A domestic manufac-
turer can react more quickly to changing conditions than a licensee that
sources offshore. An unaligned apparel company has different risks than
a vertical mill. A conglomerate (e.g., Sara Lee) is better able to lay-off
business loss than a privately owned sportswear company. A corporate
sponsor can switch gears faster and reallocate funds to another sport
more easily than a merchandise licensee. A television network is better
able to tolerate significant financial pain than is any merchandise
licensee.
Because of the widely divergent sizes and resources of licensees and
licensors alike, in addressing force majeure concerns, counsel should
strive for the adoption of a provision that is fully understood and that
suits his or her client's goals and the requirements of the client's particu-
lar business. As the drafter, once an election is made on the type of
provision to be provided, the licensor should steadfastly insist upon ac-
ceptance of its standard terms unless circumstances of a particular nego-
tiation dictate an exception, in which case, based on the thorough
understanding of the purpose of each clause of the force majeure provi-
sion, adapt the provision so that as much of that purpose can neverthe-
less be achieved. The attorney that approaches this now highly-charged
area of contract in the foregoing manner will, no doubt, find himself or
herself having a distinct advantage over the adversary that approaches
this area with nonchalance. More importantly, counsel will ensure that
its client is not "blind-sided" by unforeseen, but foreseeable, risk.
1997]

